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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California law, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent 
California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions of special importance to women. 
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I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1990). 
A photo of a minor need not be obscene to satisfy the "lascivi-
ous exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" requirement of the 
Federal Statute regulating child pornography. 
In Arvin, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and 
sentence of appellant, Michael Arvin, under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)1 
for mailing three photographs of minor females engaged in sexu-
ally explicit conduct.2 The court held that the district court did 
not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment and in excluding 
expert testimony.3 The court also found the jury instructions, 
read as a whole, properly informed the jury as to the meaning of 
"lascivious. "4 
Arvin stipulated at trial that he knowingly mailed three 
photocopied photographs of nude female children to undercover 
officer Jeffrey Miller. Arvin mailed the photocopies in response 
to an advertisement placed by Miller in Swinger's Digest seek-
ing a pedophile correspondent. The photocopies were of pictures 
he had purchased several years earlier. Arvin was not the pho-
tographer, nor did he seek financial compensation from Miller. 
All three pictures show apparently prepubescent girls com-
pletely nude, facing the camera with their legs apart so as to 
expose their genitals. The pictures were captioned "Lolita-Sex," 
"Skoleborn-School Children," and "Little Girls F_k too." 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) punishes: 
Any person who. . . knowingly. . . mails any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; and 
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct ... 
18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) defines a "minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years." § 
2256(2) defines "sexually explicit conduct" to include various specific sexual acts, as well 
as the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." "Lascivious" is 
not defined. 
2. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1386-87. 
3. Id. at 1390. 
4. Id. at 1392. 
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Arvin's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. The gov-
ernment's motion in limine to exclude expert witnesses on the 
question of whether the pictures were "lascivious" was granted:! 
The court in beginning its analysis first focused on the dif-
ference between obscenity laws and child pornography laws .. Cit-
ing New York u. Ferber,6 the court stated that pornographic de-
I 
. pictions of children do not receive First Amendment protection 
even if they are not "obscene."7 While obscenity laws aim to 
protect "the sensibilities of unwilling recipients,"S child pornog-
raphy laws aim to protect the children themselves from sexual 
exploitation and abuse.s The issue is whether the child has been 
physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the 
work. A sexually explicit depiction need not be offensive in order 
to have required the sexual exploitation of a child for its produc-
tion. lo Therefore, the obscenity tests regarding "community 
standards," "redeeming value," and "prurient interest" are not 
relevant in determining what constitutes child pornography.ll 
The appellant first argued to dismiss the indictment based 
on the district court's interpretation of section 2252(a)!2 Appel-
lant claimed that since he had no commercial motivation, the 
statute could not constitutionally or by its terms apply to him. IS 
However, the statute had been amended so that the mailing no 
longer need be for commercial purposes. 14 Appellant's second ar-
gument for dismissal was that the photos were not "lascivious" 
as a matter of law!!! The court rejected this argument, conceding 
that while it was arguable that the pictures are not lascivious, 
the issue of lasciviousness was properly allowed to go to the 
jury!6 
5. [d. at 1387. 
6. 485 U.S. 747 (1982). 
7. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1387. 
8. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973). 
9. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. 
10. [d. at 761 & n.12. 
11. [d. 
12. See note 1, supra. 
13. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1388. 
14. (As originally enacted the statute required that the mailing be "for the purpose 
of sale or distribution for sale". Following the decision in Ferber, Congress amended the 
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Appellant further argued that he was deprived of a fair trial 
by not being allowed to present expert testimony on the issue of 
whether the pictures were lascivious.17 Arvin made two argu-
ments regarding the admission of expert testimony: 1) that the 
evidence should have been admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 702,18 
and 2) that the evidence should have been admitted to avoid a 
violation of the First Amendment.19 The court found that the 
admissibility or exclusion of expert testimony is within the dis-
cretion of the trial court and that the benchmark for exclusion is 
whether the proffered testimony would usurp the function of the 
jury.20 Whether a particular situation calls for the use of expert 
testimony is to be determined on the basis of "assisting the 
trier."21 The court held that according to Arvin's offer of proof, 
the expert's testimony would not have been directed at any le-
gally relevant factors or would have impinged on the jury's 
function. 22 
Appellant argued that the experts would have testified that 
similar photos are used for educational purposes. However, the 
court found that community tolerance for equivalent material is 
irrelevant.23 Scientific or other value will not necessarily save a 
photo from legitimate prohibition.24 According to appellant, ex-
perts also would have testified that the fact that someone may 
be sexually aroused by the photos does not necessarily make 
them lascivious. The court agreed but found that the fact that 
the photos have that effect may nonetheless be relevant. 25 The 
statute reflects a legislative determination that it is a form of 
child abuse for a photographer to pose a child sexually for pur-
poses of the photographer's or another's sexual gratification.26 
Thus, the court found that the apparent motive of the photogra-
17. [d. 
18. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as 'an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." (emphasis added) 
19. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1389. 
20. [d. (citing United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d. 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
21. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1389 (citing Advisory Committee Note to Rule 702). 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 1390. 
24. [d. at 1389 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 & n.12). 
25. [d. at 1389. 
26. [d. 
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pher and intended response of the viewer are relevant. 27 
Arvin's third argument was that the trial court wrongly in-
structed the jury on the legal definition of "lascivious." The 
judge gave a list of eight specific factors that the jury could con-
sider.28 The judge guarded against the jury attaching undue sig-
nificance to any particular factor by cautioning them that the 
27.Id. 
28. Id. at 1390-91 n.4. "[T)he elements of the offense break down into the following: 
Number one is a knowing mailing. Now, in this case that's admitted, so there's ... no 
necessity for you making a decision on that. 
Second, a visual depiction. [T)he pictures in this case are obviously visual 
depictions. 
Third, the use of a minor. You will have to decide that issue based upon your obser-
vation of the pictures themselves. 
And finally, fourth element-and the one I think that you're going to have to wrestle 
with in making your decision, because I think it's the key to this case-is the lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic areas. 
[W)hen you see the photographs, it is obvious that they do involve the genitals and 
pubic area. So your decision-you must decide whether the exhibitions are lascivious. 
[T)he statute does not define ... what the word "lascivious" means. But some courts 
have considered the subject of what lascivious means. Even those courts have not given 
to us a precise definition of what that word means. They have generally held that the 
word lascivious is virtually interchangeable with the word "lewd." 
And the courts have also given us a listing of factors which you, as the decision 
makers, can consider in deciding whether the pictures are lascivious. 
. . .I'm going to list for you eight factors which the courts have said that you would 
have to decide whether these photographs were lascivious-can consider in making that 
decision . 
. . . [T)hese are the factors that you can consider in deciding whether the pictures 
involve the lascivious exhibition of the genitals or the pubic area: 
Number one: whether the focal point of the pictures is on the child's genitals or 
pubic area. 
Number two: whether the setting is sexually suggestive. For example, in a place or 
pose generally associated with a sexual activity. 
Number three: whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, considering the 
age of the child. 
Number four: whether the child was clothed or nude. 
Number five: whether the pictures suggest sexual coyness or willingness to engage in 
sexual activity. 
Number six: whether the pictures are intended or designed to elicit sexual response 
from the viewer. 
Number seven: whether the picture portrays the child as a sexual object. 
And number eight: [the) captions on the pictures. 
[A) visual depiction need not involve all of those factors in order to be a lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, but those are the factors which you can consider. 
And the weight or lack of weight which you give to anyone of those factors is for you to 
decide. 
[T)hose pictures may not be found to be lascivious merely because you may not like 
them or because you may find them to be in bad taste." 
6
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weight given to anyone factor was for them to decide. 29 Arvin's 
argument was that this instruction allowed the jury to find "las-
civiousness" from the mere presence of one factor-for example 
nudity or suggestive captions. The court disagreed with this ar-
gument and stated that viewing the instructions as a whole, no 
reasonable' juror would interpret them to allow a guilty verdict 
from the factor of nudity alone.30 The court concluded that the 
jury was properly instructed. In fact, the court stated that "the 
jurors were told about as well as any jurors could be what they 
should consider in making a determination as to whether the 
pictures were lascivious."31 
A clear definition of child pornography is essential to assist 
in the prosecution of pornographers and thus help prevent the 
exploitation and abuse of children. We need a standard that is 
specific enough to ensure that pornographers can not evade the 
intent of the law, as the defendant in this case attempted to do. 
At the same time, the courts need a standard that is easily com-
prehendible to the average juror. Here, the court is giving us a 
definition that meets both needs. By using eight factors for the 
trier of fact to consider in the interpretation of the term lascivi-
ous, the court sets out a flexible standard that is comprehensive 
enough to thwart circumvention, yet very understandable and 
usable for jurors. 
Linda Sullivan * 
B. JUVENILE ARREST 
In Re Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d 511, 277 Cal. Rptr. 14, modi-
fied, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1623 A, _ Cal. Rptr. __ (4th Dist. 
29. See note 28 supra. 
30. Aruin, 900 F.2d at 1391. 
31. Id, 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California, 
Berkeley, B.A., Social Welfare, 1988. 
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1990). 
The arrest of minors, without a warrant and solely upon a basis 
of probable cause, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In In re Samuel V., the court of appeal affirmed a juvenile 
court's ruling that defendant, minor Samuel V., remain a ward 
of the court and be detained in juvenile hall pending placement 
in a 24-hour school. The appellate court's holding was based on 
a finding that the Welfare and Institutions Code section which 
had allowed the particular type of arrest involved in this case 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Upon a report that Samuel had brandished a knife in the 
complex where he lived, peace officer Charles Pugsley told Sa-
muel's mother to bring the minor to the police station where 
Pugsley could arrest him. The peace officer did not have a war-
rant for the arrest. At the police station, without being advised 
of his Miranda l rights, Samuel admitted being involved in the 
brandishing incident. After the admission, Pugsley advised de-
fendant of his Miranda rights. 2 
While filling out a report, the peace officer asked Samuel 
whether the minor carried a knife. Defendant answered in the 
affirmative and, pulling a knife from his pants, gave it to Pug-
sley who proceeded to arrest Samuel for violation of California 
Penal Code section 417(a)(1),3 which makes the brandishing of a 
weapon a misdemeanor, and section 12020(a),4 which makes the 
carrying of a concealed dagger a felony.1I 
Samuel moved to suppress his statements and the knife al-
1. Miranda u. Arizona, 384 U,S. 436 (1966). 
2, Samuel V., 225 Cal. App, 3d at 514. 
3. Penal Code § 417(a)(1) provides in part: "Every person who, except in self-de-
fense, in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon whatso-
ever, other than a firearm, in a rude, angry or threatening manner, or who in any man-
ner, unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor . , . ," 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 417(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991), 
4. Penal Code § 12020(a) provides in part: "Any person in this state, , . who car-
ries concealed upon his person any dirk or dagger, is guilty of a felony . , , ," CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 12020(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). 
5. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App, 3d at 514. 
8
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leging they had been obtained as a result of illegal questioning. 
The motion was denied. Subsequently, Samuel admitted the fel-
ony charge and the misdemeanor charge was dismissed.s Having 
been declared a ward of the court a year earlier after admitting a 
burglary allegation,7 defendant was ordered to remain a ward of 
the court and was detained in juvenile hall pending placement in 
a 24-hour school.s 
On appeal, Samuel challenged the constitutionality of Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code section 625(a)9 which al-
lows a peace officer to arrest a minor without a warrant and 
solely upon a basis of reasonable cause for believing that the mi-
nor has violated any law of this state. 10 Defendant raised an 
equal protection claim based on the language of California Penal 
Code section 836,11 the equivalent of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code stated above but as pertaining to adults. Penal Code 
section 836 requires that for a warrantless arrest the peace of-
ficer have reasonable cause to believe that the adult committed a 
public offense in the peace officer's presence. Samuel contended 
that the differentiation involving the "in the presence" require-
ment was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment12 equal pro-
tection rights. 13 
Initially addressing the issue of whether Samuel could raise 
the constitutional claim for the first time on appeal, the appel-
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 513 nA. 
8. [d. at 513. 
9. Welfare and Institutions Code § 625(a) provides in part: "A peace officer may, 
without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor: [11) (a) who is under the age of 
18 years when such officer has reasonable cause for believing that such minor is a person 
described in Section 601 or 602 .... " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625(a) (West 1984 & 
Supp. 1991). 
Welfare and Institutions Code § 602 provides in part: "Any person who is under the 
age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state ... is within the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court." CAL. WELF. 
& INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). 
10. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 513. 
11. Penal Code § 836 provides in part: "A peace officer may make an arrest in obedi-
ence to a warrant, or may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person: [11) 1. Whenever he 
has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public 
offense in his presence. [11) 2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although 
not in his presence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1985 & Supp 1991). 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
13. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 515, 516. 
9
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late court held the claim permissible since the issue was a pure 
question of law and one based, as revealed by the record, on un-
disputed facts. 14 
The court then upheld the constitutionality of the Welfare 
and Institution Code section by analyzing the legislative history 
and purpose behind the language of the statutory provision. 
Originally, Penal Code section 836 (with a requirement of "in 
the presence of the peace officer") had applied to both adult and 
juvenile misdemeanor arrests. Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 625(a) was enacted in 1961, allowing warrantless arrests 
of juvenile misdemeanants without a requirement of "in the 
presence of the arresting officer."11I In 1971, the legislature added 
section 625.1 which implicitly imposed an "in the presence" re-
quirement for warrantless juvenile misdemeanor arrests. 16 As a 
result of section 625.1, in 1977 the California Supreme Court in-
validatedl7 a warrantless arrest of a juvenile for a misdemeanor 
offense which was not committed in the presence of the arresting 
officer. IS The following year the legislature repealed section 
625.1.19 The court of appeal held that this history showed a clear 
legislative intent to leave out the "in the presence" requirement 
in circumstances involving juvenile arrests.20 
The court further stated that defendant's allegation of dis-
parate treatment had previously been raised before, and been 
rejected by, the California Supreme Court in In re Eric J.21 In 
that case,22 the California Supreme Court held that for purposes 
of an equal protection claim, the challenger must first establish 
that the classification affects in an unequal manner two or more 
groups that are "'similarly situated.' "23 The Eric J. court held 
that minors and adults were not similarly situated since the lib-
erty interest of a minor is more restricted than that of an adult, 
that interest being subject to a tighter regulation by the state as 
14. Id. at 1623a, 1623b. 
15. Id. at 515. 
16. Id. 
17. In re Thierry S., 19 Cal. 3d 727, 139 Cal. Rptr. 708, 566 P.2d 610 (1977). 
18. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 515, 516. 
19. Id. at 516. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 (1979). 
23. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 516. 
10
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well as being controlled by the minor's parents.24 The supreme 
court further found that the purpose behind the state's regula-
tion of the liberty interest of juveniles differed from that in-
volved in the case of adults. To wit, the purpose of legislation 
addressing arrests of adults is principally punitive, punishment 
being a strong component of adult-related criminal legislation. 
In the case of juveniles, the purpose of legislation is for the most 
part rehabilitative, the punishment of minors being a means to 
an end, the end being treatment. 25 
Applying the analysis of Eric J. to this case, the court of 
appeal held that the equal protection challenge failed since the 
two affected groups here, adults and juveniles, were not similarly 
situated.26 The court strengthened its holding by addressing the 
nature of the "in the presence" requirement, stating that such a 
requirement as applied to juveniles would hinder the state's re-
habilitative goal of monitoring juvenile conduct and attacking 
character flaws at the inception before they could turn into 
criminal behavior.27 
Sarah Afshar* 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. LESBIAN CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS 
Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 
(1990). 
The former lesbian partner of the mother of a child conceived 
during the relationship through artificial insemination has no 
statutory right to custody or visitation when the couple's rela-
24. [d. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. at 516, 517. 
27. [d. at 517. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California, Los 
Angeles, B.A., English literature, 1987. 
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tionship terminates. 
In Curiale, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff with no 
natural or legal relationship to a child had no standing to assert 
a claim for custody or visitation against the child's natural 
mother with whom the child resides. Therefore, the trial court 
did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground 
that it did not have jurisdiction to award custody or visitation to 
her. The plaintiff did not have a colorable claim of right to cus-
tody and there was no statutory basis for plaintiff's claim of pa-
rental status. 
Between April 1982 and December 1987 plaintiff and de-
fendant lived together in a homosexual relationship. Plaintiff 
and defendant agreed at some point during the relationship that 
defendant would conceive a child through artificial insemination 
and that they would both raise the child. The child was born in 
June 1985. From the time of the child's birth until June 1988, 
plaintiff provided the sole financial support for herself, defend-
ant and the child. l 
The relationship between plaintiff and defendant ended in 
December 1987 and plaintiff moved out of the home. The parties 
executed a written settlement agreement providing for shared 
physical custody of the child.2 In June 1988, defendant informed 
plaintiff that she was unwilling to continue shared custody and 
visitation rights with plaintiff.3 
Plaintiff filed a "complaint to establish de facto parent sta-
tus/maternity and for custody and visitation," along with an or-
der to show cause seeking custody and visitation. Defendant 
moved to quash the order to show cause and to dismiss the com-
plaint, asserting plaintiff had no standing to initiate the 
proceeding.· 
In granting defendant's motion to quash and dismissing the 
complaint, the trial· court reasoned that none of the Civil Code 
1. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521. 
2. Plaintiff attached a copy of this settlement agreement to the complaint, but she 
did not assert any contractual claims in the trial court nor on appeal. 
3. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521. 
4. [d., 272 Cal Rptr. at 521-522. 
12
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provisions offered by plaintiff provided a basis for the proceed-
ing. Plaintiff based her claim on Civil Code sections 7015, 7020, 
and 4600 et seq.5 Civil Code sections 7015 and 7020 are part of 
the Uniform Parentage Act and deal procedurally with the de-
termination of parentage.s However, the Court of Appeal stated 
that these sections do not apply in cases where the defendant is 
the undisputed natural mother as in this case.7 
The Court of Appeal held that Civil Code section 4600 does 
not create jurisdiction.s Jurisdiction to adjudicate custody de-
pends on some proceeding already properly before the court in 
which custody is at issue such as dissolution, guardianship, or 
dependency. Plaintiff had no standing to avail herself of any of 
these. 9 
The court stressed that there is no statutory or decisional 
authority to grant plaintiff rights of custody and/or visitation 
over the objections of the child's natural parent. 10 The court re-
jected plaintiff's argument that it would be in the best interest 
of the child to confer legal status on someone who is acting as 
the parent in a non-traditional family.ll The Legislature has not 
granted a non parent in a same sex bilateral relationship any 
right to custody or visitation once the relationship terminates. 12 
Plaintiff argued that "with or without appropriate legislation", it 
IS the court's role to "confront controversy" and "resolve dis-
5. See notes 6 and 8 infra. 
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 (West 1983) [Actions with respect to existence of mother 
and child relationship) Any interested party may bring an action to determine the exis-
tence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the pro-
visions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7020 (West 1983) [Restraining orders; Offenses) states in relevant part: 
During the pendency of any proceeding under this part, upon application ... by the 
party who has care, custody, and control of the minor child, the superior court may issue 
ex parte orders enjoining any party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking, 
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, or disturbing the peace of the other party or 
the minor child. 
7. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599-1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983) states in relevant part: In any proceeding 
where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the court may, during the pendency 
of the proceeding or at any time thereafter, make such order for the custody of the child 
during minority as may seem necessary or proper. 
9. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
10. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 
386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986». 
11. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
12. Id. (citing White v. Jacobs, 198 Cal. App. 3d. 122, 243 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1988». 
13
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putes regarding the care of children in non-traditional 
families. "13 
The court did not view the role of the judiciary as innovator 
of social policy, stating that "the Legislature is better equipped 
to consider expansion of current California law should it choose 
to do SO."14 
This case demonstrates the difficulty the courts have apply-
ing the limited and rigid construction of our current code provi-
sions to the myriad of family structures that exist in our society. 
Citing the "complex practical, social and constitutional ramifica-
tions" of expanding the current statutes,111 the court displays a 
hesitancy to take an active role in shaping policy. Unfortunately, 
as the plaintiff pointed out, while we wait for the Legislature to 
act, "the courts cannot avoid controversial claims and must deal 
with real families with real disputes today. illS 
Linda Sullivan * 
B. CONSERVATORSHIP 
Kaplan v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 265 Cal. Rptr. 
408 (1989). 
A spouse may not institute and maintain a petition to es-
tablish conservatorship of another spouse. 
The Kaplan court held that a private citizen may not initi-
13. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
14. Id. at 1600-1601, (quoting In re Marriage of Lewis & Goetz, 203 Cal. App. 3d 
514, 519-520, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1988». 
15. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 27~ Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
16. Id. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California, 
Berkeley, B.A., Social Welfare, 1988. 
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ate conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-
Short (LPS) Act. I Only the county's designated conservatorship 
investigator officer may file and prosecute a petition to establish 
an LPS conservatorship.2 
In summary, the LPS Act mandates that when a person, as 
a result of a mental disorder, appears to be dangerous to self, 
others or is gravely disabled3 , peace officers and certain other 
designated persons may, upon probable cause., take that person 
to a facility designated by the county for up to 72 hours of treat-
ment and evaluation5 • If the professional staff of the evaluating 
agency find the person as a result of mental disorder or chronic 
alcoholism to be dangerous to self, others or gravely disabled8 , 
the individual may be certified for no more than 14 days of in-
tensive treatment'. The patient can· then file a writ of habeas 
corpus8 • After the hearing on the writ the client would be re-
leased or held up to the 14 days.9 
At this point, the person in charge of the evaluating agency 
may recommend to the conservatorship investigation officer that 
a conservatorship be established. Io If the investigator concurs 
with that recommendation, the investigator petitions the Supe-
rior Court in the county where the patient resides to establish 
L CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000 - 5550 (West 1984). 
2. See also D. PONE. LPS CASE SUMMARIES OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY INC. (Jan-
uary 29, 1990). 
3. "Gravely disabled" is defined in Welfare & Institution Code § 5008 (h)(I). It 
means a condition in which a person is unable to provide for his or her basic personal 
needs for food, clothing or shelter. 
4. To constitute probable cause to detain a person pursuant to § 5150, a state of 
facts must be known to the peace officer (or other authorized person) that would lead a 
person of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that 
the person detained is mentally disordered and is a danger to himself or herself or is 
gravely disabled. In justifying the particular intrusion, the officer must be able to point 
to specific and articulate facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant his or her belief or suspicion. People v. Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 
3d 283, 287·88, 192 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540-41 (1983). 
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984). See also 2 W. JOHNSTONE & S. 
HOUSE. CALIFORNIA CONSERVATORSHIPS AND GUARDIANSHIPS § 15 (1990). 
6. See supra note 3. 
7. CAL. WELF. & INST CODE § 5150 (West 1984). 
8. CAL. WELF. & INST CODE § 5275 (West 1984). Also, under Welfare & Institutions 
Code § 5276, the hearing on the petition for writ must be held within 2 judicial days 
after its filing. 
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE & 5275 (West 1984). 
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1984). 
15
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conservatorship. I I 
In June of 1989, two psychiatrists treating Mrs. Sonya Ad-
ler, recommended that the Public Guardianl2 commence LPS 
conservatorship proceedings for Mrs. Adler. The Public Guard-
ian, Mr. Douglas A. Kaplan, refused to act towards establishing 
a conservatorship. Mr. Kaplan felt that there were alternative 
measures to a conservatorship.13 
Mrs. Adler's husband, Mr. Gerald Adler, petitioned the Su-
perior Court to appoint himself and Ms. Carolyn Young co-con-
servators for Mrs. Adler, alleging she was gravely disabled within 
the meaning of LPS.14 Mr. Adler alleged the Public Guardian 
failed to conduct a proper investigation and either failed to exer-
cise his discretion under LPS, or abused that discretion by not 
commencing an LPS conservatorship proceeding. IIi Mr. Adler 
also argued that if the designated agency refused to act in estab-
lishing a conservatorship, any person authorized by the Probate 
Code to file a petition for conservatorshipl6 may also pursue an 
LPS remedy.17 
The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain a 
petition brought by someone other than the county's designated 
investigation officer. IS The Public Guardian filed an application 
for extraordinary relief with the Court of Appeal seeking Mr. 
Adler's petition. 19 
The Court of Appeal held that only the county's designated 
conservatorship investigation officer may file and prosecute a pe-
tition to establish a conservatorship under the LPS act20• The 
court cites the legislative intent noting that the Legislature has 
11. Id. 
12. Each county in the state is directed to designate a conservatorship investigation 
agency. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5351 (West 1984). Yolo County has designated the 
office of the Public Guardian. 
13. Kaplan at 1356, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 409. 
14. Id. at 1358, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 410. 
15. Id. 
16. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1820 (a)(2) lists the proposed conservatee's spouse as one who 
may petition for conservatorship. 
17. See supra note 3. 
18. Kaplan at 1357, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 409. 
19. Id. 
20. Kaplan at 1360, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 411. 
16
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determined that the safeguards attending Probate Code con-
servatorships are insufficient and that the restraints of the Pro-
bate Code may be imposed only after complying with LPS21. 
The court also recognized that when the power of the state is 
invoked to deprive individuals of their freedom, the decision to 
commence judicial proceedings should be left to a public 
officer.22 
A person subject to an LPS conservatorship is now further 
protected under The Kaplan court's holding regarding the LPS 
Act. Kaplan upholds the statutory protection of the LPS Act 
which strive to eliminate indiscriminate and involuntary com-
mitment.23 LPS provides a neutral public investigator to investi-
gate the need for a conservatorship or find less restrictive alter-
natives to a conservatorship. 
Lisa K. McCally* 
C. SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
In re Marriage of Watt, 214 Cal. App. 3d 340, 262 Cal. Rptr. 783 
(1st Dist. 1989). 
In an action for spousal support, a trial court must con-
sider, in making its decision, the total contributions of one 
spouse to the other's attainment of an education and the rea-
sons for the marital standard of living. Reimbursement for such 
contributions is limited to those expenditures directly going to 




23. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1984). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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In In re Marriage of Watt, the court of appeal held that 
when making a spousal support award decision pursuant to Cali-
fornia Civil Code Section 4801/ in a marital dissolution action, 
the trial court must take into consideration the contribution for 
living expenses made by one spouse to the other's attainment of 
an education. The court also held that a trial court, in applying 
the spousal support criterion, must consider the reasons for the 
actual marital standard of living, such as a depressed standard 
of living during the completion of the spouse's education. In its 
decision the court further held that under Civil Code Section 
4800.3 ordinary living expenses expended for the spouse's educa-
tion are not reimbursable community expenditures. 
In 1985, the marriage of Elaine and David Watt was termi-
nated. 2 The Watts had been married for nine and one-half years 
before separating. The couple had no children.s 
During the entire nine and one-half years of marriage David 
was a full time student. He advanced from an undergraduate 
program to postgraduate studies and finally medical school. Dur-
ing the entire marriage, Elaine worked full-time using all of her 
income for family expenses. Five months after their separation 
David received his medical degree.4 
At the divorce trial, the court denied Elaine's request for 
reimbursement for community funds spent on David's educa-
tion.1i The court ordered David to pay Elaine's attorney fees but 
did not grant her any further relief.6 Elaine appealed the judg-
ment and David cross-appealed on the issue of fees. 
Elaine's appeal included the issues of spousal support based 
on need and funds for her career retraining.7 The court of appeal 
found no error in this part of the trial court's decision.6 
1. All further statutory references are to the California Civil Code. 
2. Watt, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 786. 
3. Id. at 344, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 785. 
4.Id. 
5. Id. at 346, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 786. 
6. Id. at 345, 262 Cal. Rprt. at 786. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. at 348·49, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 787. The trial court found that Elaine had no 
need, pursuant § 4801(a)(I)(A), for retraining or education to acquire more marketable 
skills. The court of appeal upheld the decision, finding substaintial evidence to support 
18
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Elaine raised three other issues on appeal. The first in-
volved the interpretation of amendments to the Family Law 
Act,9 specifically sections 4800.3, subdivision (b)(1) and 4801, 
subdivision (a)(1)(c)1° which were enacted in 1984.11 The court 
of appeal stated that although section 4800.3, subdivision (d) 
limits the exclusive remedy for the education or enhanced earn-
ing capacity of a spouse to reimbursement and loan assignment, 
it also elicits that nothing therein" 'shall limit consideration of 
the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the 
amount reimbursed ... the circumstances of the parties for the 
purpose of an order for support pursuant to Section 4801.' "12 
Looking then to section 4801, subdivision (a)(2), the court held 
that the section should be interpreted broadly, stating "weighty" 
consideration should be given by the trial court to all of the 
working spouse's contributions to the other's attainment of an 
education and enhanced earning capacity when "deciding the 
propriety and extent of a spousal support award. "13 The court 
went on to say that nothing in the statute's language limits 
spousal contribution to direct educational expenses. 14 Finding 
that the court either failed to correctly interpret the applicabil-
ity of section 4801, subdivision (a)(2) or made a finding contrary 
to the evidence regarding Elaine's contribution, the court of ap-
peal reversed on this portion of the trial court's judgment. 
Further regarding Elaine's appeal on the issue of support, 
the court of appeal agreed with the plaintiff that the reasons for 
the marital standard of living during the marriage should have 
been considered when the trial court was making its spousal 
the finding. [d. at 348, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 787. 
Nor did the court of appeal find error in the trial court's denial of a spousal support 
award based on need. The court upheld the trial court's decision which was based on 
balancing Elaine's monthly net income with her monthly expenses. [d. at 349, 262 Cal 
Rptr at 788. 
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4000 - 5174 (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1990). 
10. The Legislature amended § 4801 subdivision (a) in 1988. Section 4801, subdivi-
sion (a)(l)(c) is now § 4801 (a)(2) and will be referred to as such hereafter. Watt, 214 
Cal. App. 3d at 347 n.4, 262 Cal Rptr at 787 n.4. 
11. [d. at 346, 262 Cal. Rptr at 786. 
12. [d. at 350, 262 Cal. Rptr. 789. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. 789. In making the award the trial court shall consider 
under § 4801(a)(2) "[t)he extent to which the supported spouse contributed to the at-
tainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the other spouse." 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801, (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1990). 
19
Sullivan et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
632 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:629 
support determination. l & The trial court held, in error, that since 
Elaine's standard of living had not lowered from what it had 
been during the marriage, no support was necessary. IS 
The court of appeal found error in the trial court's applica-
tion of section 4801 regarding the standard of living factor. The 
court of appeal held that in reaching its decision the trial court 
should not ignore the fact that the couple deliberately depressed 
their standard of living during the marriage by having one 
spouse absent from the work force while he attained his educa-
tion, with the future expectation of the improvement of the 
community standard of living should David obtain his medical 
degree and thereafter practice medicine. 17 The trial court's 
straight dollar-for-dollar analysis was rejected as the sole factor 
in making such a support award. 18 
Finally, in regard to Elaine's request for reimbursement for 
contributions to David's education, the court of appeal disagreed 
with plaintiff's interpretation of section 4800.3. The court of ap-
peal held that section 4800.3 is limited to reimbursement for ex-
penses related only to education-related expenses, such as tui-
tion, fees, and books. IS As the community only paid for ordinary 
15. Watt, 414 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790. 
16. [d. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 789-790. 
17. [d. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The Legislature, in August 1988, amended 
§ 4801(A), which became effective January 1, 1989: 
To make the standard of living established during the mar-
riage an overreaching reference point against which the court 
assesses the other spousal support factors. (Stat. 1988, ch. 407, 
§ 1, p. 1555.) The trial court must also make specific factual 
finding concerning the appropriate standard. Further, the 
amendments now require the trial court to generally recognize 
the extent to which the working spouse contributed to the stu-
dent spouse's attainment of an education, rather than consid-
ering this factor only with respect to the earning capacity of 
each spouse. 
[d. at 352-353 n.8, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790 n.8. 
As the parties did not present the issue of whether the 1988 amendments would apply on 
remand, the court of appeal did not express an opinion concerning retroactive applica-
tion. [d. at 353 n.8, 262 Cal Rptr. at 790 n.8. 
18. [d. at 352, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790. 
19. [d. at 354, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 791. The court relied on the California Law Revision 
Comment to § 4800.3: .. 'Subdivision (a) does not detail the expenditures that might be 
included within the concept of 'community contributions.' These expenditures would at 
least included cost of tuition, fees, books and supplies, and transportation.'(CLRC Com., 
West's Ann. Code, §4800.3 (1989 pocket part supp. p. 95.)" [d. 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/6
1991] SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW 633 
living expenses, no funds were reimbursable.20 
The court of appeal further rejected Elaine's argument that 
unless it construed section 4800.3 as encompassing reimburse-
ment for all living expenses "it must be declared unconstitu-
tional." Elaine argued anything less than her interpretation is a 
violation of due process and equal protection.21 The court stated 
that a right to reimbursement for a spouse's voluntary spending 
for the couple's living expenses during the marriage is not con-
stitutionally guaranteed.22 
In the alternative, Elaine asked the court of appeal to de-
clare David's medical degree to be community property.23 The 
court rejected this alternative holding, pursuant to section 
4800.3, subdivision (d), the only remedy in California upon mari-
tal dissolution for educational contributions, from one spouse to 
another, to be reimbursement.24 
Kelly A. McMeekin* 
D. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
In re Marriage of Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1236, 273 Cal. Rptr. 
20. [d. at 354, 262·Cal. Rptr. at 791-792. Section 4800.3 states the basic rule that 
community contributions must be reimbursed. Section 4800.3, subdivision (b)(l): "The 
community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to the education or training 
. of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party. The amount 
reimbursed shall be with interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calander 
year in which the contributions were made." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3, (Deering 1984). 
Section 4800.3, subdivision (a) defines reimbursable community contributions. Section 
4800.3, subdivision (a): " As used in this section, 'community contributions to education 
or training' means payment made with community property for education or training or 
for the repayment of a loan incurred for education or training." [d. 
21. [d. at 345, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 792. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 355, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 792. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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516 (4th Dist. 1990). 
When a divorcing couple stipulates to the value of the commu-
nity house, the stipulation will not be set aside on a mere show-
ing that one of the parties had limited knowledge, which that 
party treated as sufficient at the time of the stipulation. 
In In re Marriage of Hahn, the court of appeal affirmed the 
trial court's ruling that the stipulation to the value of the divorc-
ing couple's residence would not be set aside upon the husband's 
motion, prior to entry of judgment, to reopen the stipulated 
issue. 
In this action for dissolution of the parties' marriage, the 
husband sought to have the family home sold and the proceeds 
divided. l He stipulated to the value of the residence, a value set 
by his own appraiser. 2 The trial court, however, granted the 
wife's request that the property be awarded to her with appro-
priate set-oft's. 3 After the trial and prior to entry of judgement, 
the husband sought to reopen the issue of the house's value 
based on new evidence of its higher market value.· The trial 
court denied the husband's motion and the husband appealed. I! 
To emphasize the rationale behind the binding eft'ect of 
most stipulations, the court quoted from Witkin on California 
Evidence,6 holding that "'a stipulation is an agreement be-
tween ... adverse parties relating to a matter involved in a ju-
dicial proceeding' " and that a stipulation would have the force 
of " 'a judicial admission removing [the stipulated] issues from 
the case.'''7 Also quoting from Restatement 2nd of Contracts,S 
the court held that" '[s]tipulations ... simplify and expedite 
the proceeding, [as well as support] the policy of favoring com-
promise in order to reduce the volume of litigation.' "9 A stipula-
tion, like a contract, is an embodiment of a compromise. lo As 





6. 1 Witkin, California Evidence § 648 (3d ed. 1986). 
7. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1239, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 517. 
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 94 comment a (1981). 
9. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1239, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 517. 
10. [d. 
22
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such, reneging on one's promise not only evinces a lack of good 
faith and fair dealing, but in a context such as divorce it acts as 
an incentive for the other party to renege on other stipulated 
values of community assets, and thus turn an otherwise short 
trial into a full blown litigation. ll 
The underlying assumption behind the general rule is that a 
court should not have to continually redistribute community as-
sets up to the time of final judgement on the basis of the fre-
quently changing market value of those assets. I2 "The court is 
under no obligation to undertake a continuing responsibility to 
assume the role of an on-call broker or real estate 
appraiser . . . . "13 
The court, however, recognized that the husband's appeal 
was not completely meritless since in certain instances a trial 
court could properly review a stipulated value. I4 To wit, if the 
property is sold or disposed of by the party entitled to it at any 
time before entry of judgment, or even after appellate reversal of 
the property division award, for a much higher value than that 
stipulated to, the trial court should review the stipulation. 111 The 
rationale behind this exception is that in case of a dramatic and 
actual change in the status of the property (Le., sale, forfeiture, 
etc.), a court could readily determine the fair market value of 
the property and has discretion to relieve the parties from the 
stipulation. I6 
Here, however, there was no actual confirmation of the 
value of the property through either a sale, forfeiture, or some 
other method of disposition; rather, there was a post-trial re-
quest for evaluation based merely on more current information 
of market valueY The court of appeal held that the exception to 
the rule did not apply in this case and that it was well within the 
trial court's discretion to deny the husband's motion. IS The hus-
band's claim that he had been mistaken as to the value of the 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 1241. 273 Cal Rptr. at 518. 519. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1240, 1241, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 518, 519. 
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house at the time of the stipulation was held not a proper de-
fense. 19 Under contract law,20 a party bears the risk of mistake 
when that party knows his knowledge to be limited and yet pro-
ceeds to form a contract.21 
Since the court explained that in some situations a reevalu-
ation would be proper, it found the husband's appeal not com-
pletely without merit and, therefore, denied the wife's request 
for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. 22 
Sarah Afshar* 
III. TORT LAW 
A. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Wise v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 272 Cal. Rptr. 
222 (5th Dist. 1990). 
The wife of a sniper is not liable for the injuries caused by 
her husband either on the basis of a duty created by a special 
relationship or under general negligence principles. The court 
also held the wife not liable on the grounds of negligent 
entrustment. 
In Wise v. Superior Court, the court of appeal granted 
Rosemary Wise's petition for a writ of mandate directing the 
trial court to vacate its order overruling her demurrer and to 
enter a new order sustaining her demurrer without leave to 
amend. 
19. [d. at 1241, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 519. 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981). 
21. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1241, 273 Cal Rptr. at 518. 
22. [d. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California, Los 
Angeles, B.A., English Literature, 1987. 
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On or about September 21, 1988, John Southey Wise (dece-
dent) mounted a sniper attack from the roof of his home. Before 
taking his own life, he severely injured several passing motorists, 
including the plaintiffs Ginger Myers and David Luchetti. The 
plaintiffs filed an action against the decedent's wife Rosemary 
Wise l and her sister Michelle Gendreau,2 owner of the home in 
which the Wises resided. 3 
The trial court overruled the wife's demurrer to the com-
plaint and the court of appeal granted the wife's petition for a 
writ of mandate directing that the demurrer be sustained.4 For 
the purposes of the demurrer, the court of appeal assumed the 
facts, alledged by the plaintiffs, to be true.1\ The allegations in 
the first amended complaint were that the decedent had a "his-
tory of erractic and violent behavior prompted in part by his 
abuse of drugs and alcohol," and that he was a "human time 
bomb."6 Specifically the plaintiffs alleged: 
'(1) a long history of arrests since 1965 including 
drug possession, robbery and burglary, and a con-
viction for grand theft and possession of danger-
ous drugs; (2) a long history of alcoholism and 
heavy drug use including heroin, LSD, cocaine, 
barbiturates, amphetamines, and marijuana; (3) a 
long history of psychiatric treatment for depres-
sion, aggressive behavior and criminal conduct; 
(4) a collection of wild and dangerous animals at 
defendants' residence· including a boa constrictor 
and alligators and raised rabbits to feed these ani-
mals; (5) been unemployed for long periods of 
time including a lengthy time prior to and on 
September 21, 1988; (6) been observed romping 
naked in defendants' backyard with his two small 
pet alligators in 1987, and reported to police and 
defendants by neighbors; (7) access to and posses-
sion of an arsenal of weapons at defendants' resi-
dence including at least eight (8) pistols, four (4) 
rifles including an assault rifle, two (2) shotguns, 
1. Individually and in her capacity as executor of decedent's estate. 
2. Gendreau was not a party to Rosemary Wise's petition. 
3. Wise, 222 Cal. App. 3d' at 1011, 272 Cal. Rpt. at 223. 
4. [d. at 1016, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226. 
5. [d. at 1011, 272 Cal. Rptr. :l.t 223. 
6. [d. at 1012, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 223. 
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one (1) machine gun and ample ammunition for 
all of them. . . .'7 
At least one week prior to the attack, Mrs. Wise left their 
home due to her husband's increasingly unstable behavior.8 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged alternative theories of lia-
bility. The complaint attempted to establish a duty by the wife 
to protect the motorists based upon a special relationship or 
upon general negligence principles. The complaint further al-
leged liability based on negligent entrustment of the weapons.9 
In regards to the special relationship portion of the claim, 
the court of appeal held that the complaint failed to establish 
the requisite special relationship of the defendant to either the 
decedent or the plaintiffs.1o The court recognized, that "in gen-
eral one owes no duty to control the conduct of a third person to 
prevent him from causing physical harm to another," but at 
times a "special relationship may exist between the defendant 
and either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or 
the foreseeable victim of that conduct,"ll which does give rise to 
such a duty. Such special relationships, t.he court stated, in-
cluded those "between parent and child (citation omitted), 
master and servant, (citation omitted), the possessor of land or 
chattels (who has a duty to control the conduct of a licensee) 
(citation omitted), and '[o]ne who takes charge of a third person 
whom he knows or should know likely to cause bodily harm to 
others if not controlled' ... (citation omitted)."12 The common 
link between these special relationships is the ability to control 
the third party. The court found no such ability in this case. 
7. [d. at 1012, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224. 
8. [d. 
9. Negligent Entrustment: 
'One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel 
for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason 
to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience or oth· 
erwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable bodily 
harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect 
to share in, or be in the vicinity of its use, is subject to liability 
for bodily harm caused thereby to them.' 
Johnson v. Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d, 272, 273, 17 Cal. Rprtr. 81. (1961) (quoting A.L.I. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 390). 
10. [d. at 1013, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224. 
11. [d. at 1013, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224·225. 
12. [d. at 1013, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 225. 
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Finding that the natural relationship between the decedent and 
his wife created no inference of an ability to control, the court 
stated that the actual custodial ability must be shown.13 The 
court disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertation that the decedent 
was "'dependant upon the petitioner's supervision and con-
trol,'" and that the petitioner had assumed responsibility for 
her husband.14 The court found instead that the decedent was 
an individual who was beyond self-control and beyond the con-
trol of another. 111 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not allege a special rela-
tionship between themselves and the petitioner.16 The court 
found that neither the injury nor the harm was foreseeable. 17 
The only violent threat that the decedent had made was towards 
a neighborhood cat, which had killed one of his rabbits. More-
over, the court stated that even if the petitioner knew of her 
husband's violent potential, no facts were alleged that she knew 
or could have known that her husband would engage in the type 
of attack which occurred. IS 
Alternatively, relying on the standards of ordinary care, the 
plaintiffs contended that a special relationship need not be 
plead, where the defendant, through her own actions, made the 
plaintiffs' position worse and created a foreseeable risk of harm 
from the third person.19 The plaintiffs argued for the application 
of the ordinary standard of care as applied in Pamela L. u. 
Farmer.20 In Pamela L., the defendant allegedly knew of her 
husband's history of child molestation. Nevertheless, she en-
couraged and invited several young girls to use the swimming 
pool at her home while she was at work and her husband was 
home.21 The court in Wise, however, distinguished Pamela L., 
finding in that case, the victims and the harm to be forseeable. 
The young children were expressly invited by the defendant and 
the burden to avoid the sexual assault was minimal; she could 
13. [d. 






20. [d. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). 
21. Wise, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1014. 
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have merely asked that the plaintiffs not come over when she 
wasn't home.22 In Pamela L., there was a close connection be-
tween the defendant's actions and the harm incurred, a connec-
tion which the court did not find here. 23 
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim based upon 
the petitioner's alleged negligent entrustment of the weapons to 
her husband.24 The court found no facts to indicate that the 
"petitioner actually entrusted the decedent with the weapons he 
used to inflict the injuries."21i Nor, did the court find that the 
possible co-ownership of the weapons gave rise to constructive 
negligent entrustment, as no facts indicated that the defendant 
aided or facilitated her husband's use of the weapons.26 
In conclusion, the plaintiffs offered several public policy 
reasons why the court should follow the "trend to 'expand the 
list of special relationships which justify imposing liability,' "27 
and impose liability upon the petitioner in this case; to wit "the 
benefit to the community of reducing 'the risk that citizens will 
encourage mentally ill family members to repeat this all 'too fa-
miliar type of mass shooting-suicide incident;' "28 the fact that 
the damages would be used to pay for the extensive medical 
bills; and the fact that there was home insurance available.29 
The court felt, however, that there were public policy reasons for 
limiting the scope of liability of the petitioner here.30 Particu-
larly, the court stated its belief that "the responsibility for tor-
tious acts should lie with the individual who commits those acts; 
absent facts which clearly give rise to a legal duty that responsi-
bility should not be shifted to a third party."31 
While attitudes towards the roles of women in society have 
changed over the years, the plaintiffs, in this case, expose the 
22. Id. at 1014, 1015, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 225, 226. 
23. Id. at 1015, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226. 
24. This claim was based upon the allegation that the petitioner had a community 
property interest in the weapons. Id. 
25.Id. 
26.Id. 
27. Id., (quoting Pamela L., supra, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 211). 
28. Id. at 1015. The court took offense to this suggestion, that the petitioner "en-
couraged" the decedent's attack. Id. at 1015 nA, 272 Cal. Rptr. 226 nA. . 
29. Id. at 1015, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. at 1016, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226. 
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continuing attitude still held by some in society, that women are 
or should be responsible for the irresponsible acts of men. This 
attitude is prevelant in many rape cases, where the victim is 
often blamed for the acts of her attacker. 
In this case, the plaintiffs seem to liken the wife's role to 
that in a parent-child relationship. They put the husband in the 
position of acting as child to his own wife, rather than as an 
individual, equal participant in a marriage. Fortunately, the 
court realized that merely because one is married, tortious 
liabilty for the actions of your spouse is not automatically im-
posed. 
Kelly A. McMeekin* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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